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ANNOTATIONS ON THE CONSISTENCY OF 
THE CLOSED WORLD ASSUMPTION 
GERHARD J;iGER 
D The treatment of negation and negative information in a logic programming 
environment has turned out to be a major problem. We introduce a 
relativized version of Reiter’s closed world assumption and study it from a 
logical point of view. In particular, we look at the questions of consistency 
and conservative extension. a 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of negation and negative information in a logic programming 
environment has turned out to be a major problem. A starting point for all 
discussions is the programming language PROLOG, which is fairly efficient and 
realizes some ideas of logic programming. However, the expressive power of (pure) 
PROLOG is very limited, and it is not possible to treat negation naturally, as would 
be desirable for such an elementary concept. 
A typical PROLOG program consists of a finite set of so called definite Horn 
clauses, i.e. formulas of the form 
A,&A,& ... &A,+B 
where k is larger than or equal to 0, and B, A,, . . . , A, are atomic formulas. Definite 
Horn formulas state what is true provided that something else is true; they do not 
state what is false. 
It is clear that every PROLOG program 71 has a model and that r I+ --, B for any 
atomic B. If one chooses the declarative semantics and identifies the meaning of a 
program r with the set of its logical consequences, 
meaning(a):= {A:atA}, 
then 7~ does not reflect negative information. 
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This deficiency in the ability to express negation can be healed by adding new 
(meta) concepts to the plain deductive approach to logic programming. Clark’s 
negation as failure rule and his completion of theories [5], Reiter’s closed world 
assumption [18], and McCarthy’s circumscription [12] are probably the most famil- 
iar ones, but there are more, and the interested reader should consult Shepherdson’s 
excellent survey article [23] on negation in logic programming for further informa- 
tion. 
Reiter’s closed world assumption (CWA) is the mathematically most rigid form 
for introducing negation. It is motivated by applications in data base theory and 
proceeds on the assumption that a data base T contains all positive information and 
that any positive ground literal which is not implied by T is false. Although based 
on a very elementary idea, the use of the closed world assumption is not unproblem- 
atic at all, since it often leads to inconsistencies. 
In order to gain more flexibility, we introduce a relativized version of Reiter’s 
original notion. Given a first order theory T and a sequence P = P,, . . . , P,, of 




as additional axioms. The idea behind this approach is the following: (1) T is a 
formal representation of our (present) knowledge. (2) It can be split into stable facts 
SF which do not refer to the relations _P, and data DB about _P: T = SF + DB. (3) 
The meaning of the constants, function symbols, and relation symbols different 
from P is reflected by SF; the meaning of the relation symbols _P is given by SF, 
DB, and the closed world assumption with respect to _P. 
In this paper we study logical and mathematical aspects of the relativized closed 
world assumption. It is our aim to provide directions for the legitimate use of this 
important concept and to gain a better understanding of its meaning. In particular, 
we develop criteria for CWA,(T) to be consistent and a conservative extension of 
T for suitable classes of formulas. 
Section 1 describes the general scenario and presents some basic definitions. 
Section 2 is devoted to a semantic approach to the closed world assumption. We 
introduce the notions of primary model (Definition 2.5) and weak categoricity 
(Definition 2.11) modulo _P, and use them to prove some consistency results for the 
CWA. In addition, we turn to the domain closure property, a version of complete- 
ness, and a conservative extension statement. We conclude, in Section 3, by 
discussing the closed world assumption in connection with the important classes of 
inductive and Z inductive data bases. We study their intended models and apply 
results of the previous section to gain consistency and conservative extension 
statements for the CWA. 
We hope that the results of this paper contribute to pointing out the usefulness 
and the limitations of the closed world assumption. 
There is related work which should be mentioned: Chapter 3 of Lloyd’s textbook 
on logic programming [ll] is dedicated to negation. Reiter [18] introduces the closed 
world assumption and provides a lot of motivation for the use of this concept in 
data base theory. Three papers [21-231 of Shepherdson’s address the treatment of 
negation in logic programming in general and establish important results concerning 
CONSISTENCY OF THE CLOSED WORLD ASSUMPTION 231 
the connections between the closed world assumption and alternative approaches. 
Lifschitz [lo] treats the relationship between circumscription and the closed world 
assumption. Makowsky [13] is interested in the closed world assumption in the 
context of his generic (term) models. Minker [14] and Henschen and Park [8] 
formulate a so-called generalized closed world assumption which is able to take care 
of some forms of indefinite knowledge. In all these articles the question of the 
consistency of the closed world assumption plays a more or less important role. In 
this paper we focus on this essential logical property and try to provide some sound 
theoretical foundations for the safe use of the closed world assumption in logic 
programming, logical data bases, information processing, and the like. 
1. GENERAL SCENARIO 
We will deal with a countable first order language L with equality and an arbitrary 
number of function and relation symbols. The terms a, 6, c, a,, b,, cl,. . . and 
formulas A, B, C, A,, B,, C,, . . . of L are defined as usual; formulas and terms 
withcut free variables are called ground. We write a for a finite string a,, . . . , a, of 
L terms and use the notation A[&] to indicate that all free variables of A come from 
the list 14; A(x) may contain other free variables besides x. An L theory is a 
(possibly infinite) collection of ground L formulas. By T F A we express that the 
formula A can be deduced from the theory T by the usual axioms and rules of 
predicate logic with equality. An L theory T is inconsistent if every L formula is 
deducible from T, otherwise T is consistent. 
The collection of Horn clauses consists of all L formulas of the form 
(i) A, 
(ii) ,B,v ..’ v,B,,vA, 
(iii) YB, v .‘- v,B,, 
where A and B,, . . . , B, are atomic formulas; Horn clauses of the form (i) and (ii) 
are called definite Horn clauses. If A is a formula, then the universal closure of A is 
the formula obtained by adding a universal quantifier for every variable having a 
free occurrence in A. A logic program is a finite collection of universal closures of 
definite Horn clauses. 
In addition, L is supposed to contain a sequence _P = Pi,. . . , P, of relation 
symbols, which we assume to be unary in order to keep the notation as simple as 
possible; the extension of our results to relation symbols P of arbitrary arities is 
straightforward. L, is the sublanguage of L without occurrences of the relation 
symbols _P; QF denotes the class of quantifier-free L formulas. 
Reiter’s closed world assumption (CWA) [18] will be used in this paper in the 
following form: For every L theory T we define the set 
NEG,(T):= G {,P,(~):aground&Tt+P~(a)} 
i=l 
of all ground formulas 7P,(a) which cannot be proved in T. Then we put 
CWA,(T):= T+NEG,(T). 
Similar forms of a relativized closed world assumption have been mtroduced in 
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Genesereth and Nilsson [6] and Jiiger [9]. Working with the closed world assump- 
tion means working in two different levels. In the first level one has the theory T 
and checks whether certain atomic formulas Pi(a) are provable or not. In the 
second level T is extended by negations of some nonprovable atoms and then 
the usual derivation procedure is initiated. Formally these two levels are reflected by 
the fact that provability with the closed world assumption is Z& and not ZF 
(recursively enumerable) as usual. 
Example 1.1. Let S, be a theory which formalizes that its universe consists of 
exactly five elements a,, . . . , as. Then define for 1 zz m I 5 
T[m]:=S,+ {P(a,):lli~m}. 
With the help of the closed world assumption we can easily show that 
CWA,(T[m])kVx(P(x) * x=a,V 0.. Vx=a,). 
REMARK 1.2. The closed world assumption is a nonmonotonic concept in the sense 
that T c T’ does not imply that the theorems of CWA,(T) are theorems of 
CWA,(T’) as well. To give an example, consider the theories T[2] a.nd T[3] above. 
Then we have: 
(i) T]21 c 7731; 
(ii) CWA,(T[2]) I- ,P(a,); 
(iii) CWA,(T[3]) k -P(a3). 
The closed world assumption is a very handy and well-motivated concept as long 
as elementary assertions about _P are considered. Then the use of the CWA causes 
no problems, and the meaning of CWA,(T) is perfectly clear. However, as soon as 
more complex situations are taken into account one has to be careful. Consider the 
following example. 
Example 1.3. Let T be the theory S, + { P( ai) V P( u2)}. Then neither P( a,) nor 
P(az) is provable in T such that CWA,(T) E ,P(ai) & ,P(a,). This yields the 
inconsistency of CWA,(T), since CWA,(T) proves P(q) V P(az) as well. 
This example tells us that CWA,(T) may be inconsistent even if T is consistent. 
But in order to use the closed world assumption properly one has to be sure that 
CWA,(T) is consistent. A complete characterization of those theories T which give 
rise to a consistent CWA,(T) has not been found yet, and it seems very unlikely 
that there exists a natural one. However, there are some partial results which cover 
most of the relevant cases. 
2. SEMANTIC APPROACH TO THE CONSISTENCY OF THE CWA 
In this section we discuss the consistency of the closed world assumption from a 
semantic point of view by using modifications of well-understood concepts of 
traditional model theory. To start with, we repeat some standard notions and 
introduce variations thereof. 
An L structure is a pair M = (M, I) consisting of a nonempty set M and a 
mapping I which assigns a function I(f) : Mk -+ M to every k-ary function symbol 
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f and a set I(R) c Mk to every k-ary relation symbol R of L. In the following we 
often write f M and RM instead of I(f) and I(R), and denote the universe of M by 
]M]. The L structure M is called countable if the cardinality of IMI is less than or 
equal to 0. 
The validity of ground formula A in the structure M is defined as usual and 
denoted by M b A. M is a model of the theory T if M b A holds for all A in T. 
Finally we write T k A if the ground formula A is valid in all models of the theory 
T. Godel’s completeness theorem then implies that T t- A if and only if T t= A. 
Let M and N be two L structures. We call M equal to N modulo _P, in symbols 
M = N modulo _P, if f M = f N for all function symbols f and RM = RN for all 
relation symbols R which do not occur in 1. An isomorphism from M to N modulo 
_P is a bijective mapping H from [MI to IN] which satisfies 
(i) fN(H(ml),...,H(m,))=H(fM(m,,...,mk)), 
(ii) (H(m,) ,..., H(m,)) E RN - (m, ,..., mk) l RM 
for all m,,..., mk E ]M], all function symbols f, and all relation symbols R which 
do not occur in _P. M and N are isomorphic module P if there exists an isomorphism 
from M to N modulo _P; in this case we write M = N modulo _P. M is a substructure 
of N modulo _P if IMI is a subset of IN] and (i) and (ii) are satisfied for H replaced 
by the identity mapping restricted to ]M]. If we choose _P to be the empty sequence, 
we obtain the usual definitions of isomorphism and substructure. 
Lemma 2.1. Let M and N be L structures and H an isomorphism from M to N. Then 
we have for all L formulas A[ x1,. . . , xk] and m,, . . . , mk E JMJ 
MkA[m, ,..., mk] * NkA[H(m,) ,..., H(m,)]. 
Lemma 2.2. Let M and N be isomorphic L structures modulo _P_ Then there exists an 
L structure M’ which is equal to M modulo &’ and isomorphic to N. 
PROOF. Let H be an isomorphism from M to N modulo _P. Then we define M’ by 
(i) ]M’] := ]M], 
(ii) f M’ := f M, 
(iii) RM’ := RM 
for all function symbols f and relation symbols R different from _P = Pr,. . . , P,. In 
addition, we define for all P,, . . . , P, 
(iv) PjM’:={m~]MI: H(m)EP,N}. 
It is obvious that M’ is equal to M modulo _P and isomorphic to N. •I 
Dejinition 2.3 (Inductive definition of 2 and II formulas of L). 
1. Every QF formula is a Z and II formula. 
2. If A is a Z formula [II formula], then 7A is a II formula [Z formula]. 
3. If A and B are Z formulas [II formulas], then A & B and A V B are Z 
formulas [II formulas]. 
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4. If A is a Z formula [II formula] and B a II formula [Z formula], then 
A -+ B is a II formula [Z formula]. 
5. If A(x) is a Z formula, then 3xA(x) is a Z formula. 
6. If A(x) is a II formula, then VxA(x) is a II formula. 
Lemma 2.4. Let M be a substructure of N. Then we have for all QFformulas A[x], Z 
formulas B[x], n formulas C[x], and m_ E IMI 
(a) MkA[m] - N!=A[g]; 
(b) M t= B[~J] * NI= B[~J]; 
(c) Nk C[WI] * Mb C[m_]. 
The proof of this lemma is standard and can be found in any textbook on 
mathematical logic or model theory, e.g. in [4,24]. The following definition of 
primary model is a first step in direction of the consistency of the CWA. The notion 
of primary model introduced here resembles the notions of prime model (cf. [4]) and 
initial model (cf. [7]) but is not equivalent to either of these. In the case of prime 
models substructure is replaced by elementary substructure, and in the case of initial 
models uniqueness of the substructure is required. 
DeJinition 2.5. Let T be an L theory, and M an L structure. M is a primary model 
of T modulo _P if M is a model of T and every model of T has a substructure 
which is isomorphic to M modulo _P. M is a primary model of T if M is a primary 
model of T modulo the empty sequence. 
Example 2.6. 
1. Peano arithmetic PA is a theory which has a primary model, namely the 
standard structure of the natural numbers. 
2. Let a be a ground term and R a unary relation symbol. Then the theory 
{,R(a) V R(a)} does not possess a primary model. 
Theorem 2.7. If the L structure M is a primary model of the L theory T, then M is a 
model of CWA,(T) as well. 
PROOF. Let M be a primary model of T, and assume that T H- I’,( a) for a ground 
term a and a relation symbol Pi from _P. In view of Giidel’s completeness result 
there exists a model N of T such that N b Y Pi( a). Since M is a primary model of 
T, there exists a substructure N’ of N which is isomorphic to M. By Lemma 2.4 we 
conclude N’ b Y P, (a), and therefore M b 7 P,(a) by Lemma 2.1. Hence we have 
shown that M I= NEG,(T), i.e. M K CWA,(T). 0 
The applicability of this theorem is very restricted. Example 2.6 above shows that 
even collections of (definite) Horn clauses do not necessarily possess primary 
models. Therefore Theorem 2.7 does not validate the use of the closed world 
assumption, for example, in the context of logic programming. 
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In order to obtain deeper results and as motivation for the following, it is helpful 
to recall an important idea of logic programming: Every logic program m has the 
intersection property, i.e., if M and N are Herbrand models of 7~, then their 
intersection is a model of 7~ as well; hence 7~ possesses a least Herbrand model (the 
intersection of all of its Herbrand models), and the meaning of r can be identified 
with what is valid in this least Herbrand model. 
Carried over to the closed world assumption with respect to _P, this means that 
we have to consider the intersection of L structures in the interpretations of _P. For 
two L structures M and N which are equal modulo _P, we introduce a new L 
structure M n N by 
(i) jMnN]:=]M]=]N], 
(ii) f 
MnN -fM ,fN, 
(iii) R MnN:=RMnRN 
for all function symbols f and relation symbols R of L. The new structure M n N 
differs from M and N only in the interpretation of the relation symbols f. 
Dejinition 2.8. The L theory T has the _P intersection property if for all models M 
and N of T 
M=Nmodulo_P * MnNkT. 
Similar concepts, but for completely different reasons, have been introduced into 
model theory by Rabin [16,17] and Robinson [20]; Makowsky [13] studies the 
intersection property in connection with generic (term) models and Horn logic. 
Typical theories with the _P intersection property will follow later. Now we 
consider examples which show that the _P intersection property of an L theory T 
does not guarantee the consistency of CWA,(T). These examples depend on the 
existence of an &-incomplete theory, but it is obvious that &-incomplete theories 
exist for nearly all languages L and L,. 
Definition 2.9. An L theory T is called L,-complete if T is consistent and T t A 
or T I- 7A for every ground formula A of the sublanguage L, of L. T is L,- 
incomplete if there exists a ground L, formula A such that T proves neither 
A nor -,A. 
Example 2.10. Let SF be an incomplete L, theory, and suppose that A is a 
ground L, formula such that SF proves neither A nor 7A. 
1. For two ground terms al and a2 which are provably different we define 
B(P) :o Vx[(A &x=a,) V (,A &x=a,) -P(x)], 
T,:=SF+ {B(P)}. 
Tl has the _P intersection property. It is also clear that T proves P(al) V 
P( az) but does not prove P( ai) for i = 1,2. Using the closed world assump- 
tion, we conclude that P( a,) V P(a,) and T P( a,)&-, P( a2) are theorems of 
CWA,( Tl). Hence CWA,( T,) is inconsistent. 
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2. If only a single ground term c1 is available, we define 
Following the pattern of the previous argument, we conclude that T2 has the 
P,, P2 intersection property and CWAq, p,(T2) is inconsistent. 
Our next goal is to find criteria for the E-free part of T which, together with the 
_P intersection property, ensures the consistency of CWA,(T). To achieve this, we 
need some more terminology. 
Dejinition 2.11. The L theory T is called weakly categorical module P if T has a 
countable model and any two countable models of T are isomorphic modulo _P. 
This definition means that the class of all countable models of a weakly 
categorical theory T has, up to isomorphism modulo _P, exactly one element. It does 
not say whether there are uncountable models of T and how many. The concept 
“weakly categorical” and the familiar “w-categorical” (cf. e.g. [4]) are related but 
not identical. 
REMARK 2.12. 
1. If T is weakly categorical modulo P, then T has a primary model modulo _P. 
2. If T is weakly categorical modulo _P, then T is L,complete. 
Uncountable structures do not really matter in computer science, and so we 
ignore them for a moment. Then one can think of a weakly categorical theory 
modulo _P as a theory which provides enough information to pin down its universe 
and the meaning of all function and relation symbols different from _P. 
Weak categoricity is a very strong assumption if one deals with theories which 
have an infinitary domain. Typical (mathematical) examples are atomless Boolean 
algebras, the four complete theories of dense simple order, the theory of infinite 
Abelian groups with all elements of order p (p prime), and the theory of an 
equivalence relation with infinitely many equivalence classes and each class infinite. 
For applications, weak categoricity is more important in connection with finite 
domains. Then there are many examples of weakly categorical theories modulo _P, 
and this notion is even equivalent to LO completeness if we add Reiter’s domain 
closure property [19] that every object of the universe of T can be represented by a 
ground term available in L. Domain closure plays a role in finite data base theory, 
where it is very natural to assume that every object has a name. 
Definition 2.13. The L theory T has the domain closure property (DCP) if there exist 
finitely many ground terms a,, u2,. . . , ak such that T proves 
Vx(x=a,V ... Vx=a,). 
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Lemma 2.14. Let T be an L theory which satisfies the domain closure property. Then T 
is weakly categorical module _P if and only if T is LO-complete. 
PROOF. It is obvious that weak categoricity modulo _P implies L, completeness (cf. 
Remark 2.12 above). To prove the converse direction, assume that M and N are 
countable models of T and 
TtVx(x=a,V ... Vx=a,) (1) 
for some ground L terms aI,. . . , ak. We have to show that M is isomorphic to N 
modulo 8. By (1) 
[m]:={aE{a,,...,a,}:a”=m} 
is nonempty for every m E IMI. We choose a representative b,,, of each set [m] and 
define a mapping H from JMI to IN 1 by 
II(m) :=bi 
for all m E IMI. This mapping is independent of the choice of the representatives of
the [ml, since T is L,-complete. 
It is also clear that H is l-l and onto: If H( ml) = H(m,), there are b, E [m,] 
and b, E [m,] such that b, - b, . N N By the L, completeness of T, this implies 
T F b, = b,, i.e. m, = by = by = m2. Moreover, if n E IN], we use (1) to find a term 
bE {a,,..., uk } such that n = bN. Thus n = H( b”). 
Now let 6, E [m,], . . . , b, E [m,]. Then we have for all r-ary function symbols f 
and relation symbols R different from _P and all b E [f M( m,, . . . , m,)] 
Cm 1,“‘, m,)ERM w Tt-R(b,,...,br) 
* (II(m,), II( ERR, (2) 
TFb=f(b,,...,b,), (3) 
H(f”(m,,..., m,)) =bN=fN(br ,..., b:) =fN(H(m,) ,..., II(m (4) 
This proves that T is weakly categorical modulo _P. q 
Now we return to the closed world assumption. The next results give sufficient 
conditions for the consistency of CWA,(T). Actually, we can do better and prove 
that, under suitable assumptions, CWA,(T) is a conservative xtension of T for all 
_P positive ground formulas of L. 
Definition 2.15 (Inductive dejnition of _P-positive and f-negative L formulas). 
1. All formulas of L, are in Pos(_P) and Neg(_P). 
2. If A is in Pos(_P) [Neg(P)], then ,A is in Neg(_P) [Pos(_P)]. 
3. If A and B are in Pos(_P) [Neg(_P)], then A & B and A V B are in Pos(_P) 
]Neg(_P )I. 
4. If A is in Pos(_P) [Neg(_P)] and B in Neg(_P) [Neg(_P)], then A -+ B is in 
Neg(_P) ]Pos(_P )I. 
5. If A(x) is in Pos(_P) [Neg(_P)], then VxA(x) and 3xA(x) are in Pas(p) 
PWPN 
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A formula is called _P-positive or positive in _P [P-negative or negative in I’] if it 
belongs to the class Pos(_P) [Neg(_P)]. 
The signiticance of E-positive and f-negative formulas for the closed world 
assumption comes partly from some model-theoretic properties of these classes. The 
following notion of _P extension can be regarded as the semantic counterpart to the 
syntactic notion of _P positivity. Lemma 2.17 below makes these connections more 
precise. 
Definition 2.16. Suppose that M and N are L structures, T is an L theory, and 
_p = PI,. . . ) P,. 
1. N is said to be a &’ extension of M, in symbols M I _pN, if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(i) M = N modulo P -3 
(ii) PiMCPiN forlliln. 
2. N is a proper _P extension of M if N is a _P extension of M and M # N; then 
we write M < _pN. 
3. M is a P-minimal model of T if M is a model of T and there is no model N 
of T such that N <,M. 
Lemma 2.17. Let M and N be L structures, M I ?N. If A[&] is a _P-positive formula, 
B[x] a z-negative formula, and C[x] a formula of L,, then we have for all m_ E ]M] 
(a) Mt=-4ml * Nt=AA[ml, 
(b) N~B[rnl - M@ WEI, 
(c) M k C[m] * Nt= C[m_]. 
The proof of this lemma is trivial and proceeds by induction on A and on B. We 
will make use of these results in the proof of the following main theorem of this 
section and later on in connection with inductive data bases. 
Definition 2.18. We assume that S, and S, are L theories and K is a class of ground 
L formulas. 
1. S, is an extension of S, if every theorem of S, is a theorem of S,. 
2. S, is a conservative extension of S, for K if S, is an extension of S, and 
S, I- A implies S, I- A for all A in K. 
Theorem 2.19. Let T be an L theory such that 
(Al) T is weakly categorical modul _P, 
(A2) T has the P intersection property. 
Then CWA,(T) is a conservative extension of T for all P-positive ground formulas. 
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PROOF. CWA,(T) is clearly an extension of T. To prove conservativeness for 
E-positive ground formulas, assume that 
CWA,(T) +A, (1) 
Tb‘A (2) 
for some P-positive ground formula A of L. We will show that this leads to a 
contradict&. From (1) we conclude that there are finite sets J1,. . . , Jk of ground 
terms with the properties 
k 
TU u {A’;(a): UEJI} tA, (3) 
i=l 
ThL P;(u) (4) 
for all 1 2 i I k and a E 4.. Because of (2) and the Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem we 
can choose a countable L structure M which satisfies 
M I= T, (5) 
Mi=-,A. (6) 
Again by the Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem, now using (4) there exist countable L 
structures N,, for all 1 I i I k and a E J, such that 
N,, != T, (7) 
N,, b YE(U). (8) 
It follows from assumption (Al), (5) and (7) that all N,, are isomorphic to M 
modulo _P. By Lemma 2.2, to each N,, there corresponds an L structure Mi, such 
that 
M iu = M modulo _P, 
M,, is isomorphic to N,,. 
Hence (7) (8) (lo), and Lemma 2.1 imply 






for all 1 I i 5 k and a E 4. Now we define the L structure 
M*:=Mn 6 0 M,,, 
r=l u‘q 
which is a model of T by assumption (A2) and (9): 
M*t=T. (13) 
Note that M and each M,, is a _P extension of M*. Thus we see by (6) (12), and 
Lemma 2.17 that 
M* b ,A, (14) 
M* t= yP,(u> (15) 
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for all 1~ i I k and A ~4. Finally, (3), (13), and (15) imply M* b A, which 
contradicts (14). This completes the proof of Theorem 2.19. 0 
Corollary 2.20. If the L theory T is weakly categorical module _P and has the _P 
intersection property, then CWA,( T) is consistent. 
PROOF. By the previous theorem, T is consistent if and only if CWA,(T) is 
consistent; on the other hand, T is consistent, since it is weakly categorical modulo 
_p. 0 
REMARK 2.21 (OPEN QUESTIONS). 
1. The concept of weak categoricity modulo _P has been developed with 
Theorem 2.19 in mind. Although it turns out to be very natural and useful, at 
least in the context of finite data bases, it is sometimes rather complicated to 
check whether a theory is weakly categorical modulo _P or not. Therefore it 
would be desirable to find an alternative approach which serves the same 
purpose. 
2. The definition of weakly categorical modulo _P is based on the notion of 
isomorphism. Is it possible to obtain similar results if we work with elemen- 
tary equivalences or elementary embeddings instead? 
3. INDUCTIVE DATA BASES 
In this section we introduce the notions of inductive data base and Z inductive data 
base. Using results of the previous section, we then study these concepts in 
connection with the closed world assumption, where we concentrate again on 
questions concerning conservative extension and (relative) consistency. The term 
“inductive data base” is motivated by the fact that the intended models of inductive 
data bases are constructed by inductive definition; see Lemma 3.6 for details. 
If T is an L theory, we write T_(f) for the set Tn L, and T+(J) for the 
complement of T_(f) in T. Hence T = T_(E) + T+(f), where T_(f) contains the 
information which does not refer to _P, and T+(f) collects all data about _P. 
DeJinition 3.1. A nonempty and finite collection T of L sentences is called an 
inductive data base for _P = P,, . . . , P,, if each element of T+@) is of the form 
(ID.l) V’x(A[_P, x] + P,(x)) or 
(ID.2) B(_P) 
where A[_P, x] belongs to Pos(_P) and B(_P) to Neg(_P). We call an inductive data 
base for _P definite if it does not contain sentences of the form (ID.2). An inductive 
data base for _P is said to be Z-inductive if the formulas A[_P, X] in (ID.l) are Z 
formulas and the formulas B(_P) in (ID.2) are II formulas. 
Lemma 3.2. Every inductive data base T for _P has the f intersection property. 
PROOF. Let M and N be models of T which satisfy 
M=Nmodulo_P. (1) 
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Then we have 
MnNs,M, (2) 
MnNs,N, (3) 
so that Lemma 2.17 implies 
M n N != T_(f), (4) 
MnNi=B(_P) (5) 
for all sentences B(_P) in T+(t) which are E-negative. Finally we choose a sentence 
Vx(A[_P, x] + P,(x)) of T+(E) of the form (ID.l). In view of Lemma 2.17 we then 
obtain 
MnNI=A[_P,m] * MkA[_P,m] * mEPi*, 6) 
MnNt=A[_P,m] = NFA[[_P,m] =S mEPiN, (6b) 
for all m E )M n NI. Hence it is proved that 
MnNkvx(A[_P,x]-+~,(x)). (7) 
To sum up, (4), (5), and (7) imply that M n N is a model of T. Thus our lemma is 
proved. 0 
Theorem 3.3. Let T be an L theory such that 
(Bl) T is weakly categorical modulo _P, 
(B2) T is an inductive data base for _P. 
Then CWA,( T) is a conservative extension of T for all _P-positive ground formulas. 
This theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.19 and Lemma 3.2. As 
in Section 2, we obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary 3.4. If T is weakly categorical modulo _P and an inductive data base for I’, 
then CWA,( T) is consistent. 
As a digression, we will briefly address the question about the converse of 
Corollary 3.4: What can we say about an L, theory SF, i.e. a theory which does not 
refer to Z’, if we know that CWA,(SF + DB) is consistent for all (definite) inductive 
data bases DB for _P? First we consider two special cases: 
1. L has no ground terms at all. In this case CWA,(SF + DB) = SF + DB. 
2. L has exactly one ground term a, and DB is an inductive data base for one 
unary relation symbol P. If SF + DB proves P(a), then CWA.(SF + DB) = 
SF + DB. Otherwise CWA,(SF + DB) is consistent if and only if SF + DB 
is consistent. 
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The more complex situations have already been taken care of by Example 2.10 
and Lemma 2.14: 
Theorem 3.5. Let SF be an L, theory. 
(a) Zf there exist two ground terms a and b such that SF + a f b and if 
CWA,(SF + DB) is consistent for all dejinite data bases DB for P, then SF is 
LO-complete. 
(b) Zf there exists a ground term a and if CWA., p2 (SF + DB) is consistent for all 
de$nite data bases DB for P,, Pz, then SF is LO-complete. 
(c) Zf we add the requirement that SF satisjes the domain closure property (DCP), 
then assertions (a) and (b) can be strengthened to SF being weakly categorical 
module P and modulo P,, P2, respectively. 
Now we turn to the explicit description of the intended model of an inductive 
data base for _P. The construction we use is very familiar from the theory of 
inductive definitions for the case of definite inductive data bases (cf. e.g. Moschovakis 
[15] or Bat-wise [2]) and is often called the “simultaneous induction lemma”. The 
extension to general inductive data bases is straightforward. 
Lemma and Definition 3.6. Let T be an inductive data base for _P, and M a model of 
T. Then there exists an L structure IND,(M, T) which has the following properties: 
(a) IND,(M, T) = M modulo _P, 
(b) IND,(M, T) t= T, 
(c) if N is an L structure such that 
(i) N = M module P 
-’ (ii) N b T, 
then N is a _P extension of IND,(M, T). 
We call IND,(M, T) the inductive model of T over M. 
PROOF. We assume that T is an inductive data base for _P = P,, . _ . , P,,, and M an L 
structure such that M k T. In a first step we introduce sets Ii,. . _, Z, c JMI which 
will be used as interpretations for the relation symbols P,, . . . , P,, later. For every 
s=l ,a.., n we choose K, to be the (finite) collection of all formulas A[& x] such 
that Vx(A[P, x] + P,(x)) belongs to T. By D we denote the set of all s E (1,. . . , n} 
such that K, # 0. Finally we set 
C,[_p,xl:= v A[_P,x] 
AEK, 
for all s E D; i.e., C,[Z’, x] is the disjunction of the elements in K,. Now use 






(mE(M]:M~CC,[Z,‘” ,..., Z,<a,m]} if SED, 
0 if s@D. 
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Since each formula C,[Z’, x] is _P-positive, we have Zf c Zf for all (Y < p. Hence 
there exists an ordinal K of cardinality I cardinality(]M]) such that 
z,“=z*<K= u z&K (1) 
[EOI-I 
Depending on M and T, we now introduce an L structure IND,(M, T), which 
we abbreviate as IND: 
]IND] := ]M], (2) 




RIND := RM 
(5) 
for all function symbols f and relation symbols R which do not occur in _P. It is 
clear that IND is equal to M modulo _P. 
Now we prove (c). By induction on (Y one can easily show that Zf c P,” for each 
L structure N with the properties (i) and (ii). Hence PsIND c P,” for these N, and 
therefore 
IND I _pN. (6) 
In particular, M is a _P extension of IND. 
It remains to show (b). From Lemma 2.17 and (6), with N replaced by M, we can 
conclude that all _P negative sentences of T are valid in IND, i.e. 
M k Tn Neg(_P). 
From (1) and the definition of PJND we obtain that 
INDkVx(A[_P,x] -P,(x)) 
for all sentences Vx(A[_P, x] + P,(x)) in T which have 
(8) IND is a model of T. q 
(7) 
(8) 
the form (ID.l). By (7) and 
Lemma 3.7. Zf T is an inductive data base for _P, and M, N are models of T, then 
M = N modulo _P * IND,(M, T) = IND,(N, T). 
PROOF. Let H be an isomorphism from M to N modulo 1. Over M and N we 
define the sets Z,” as in the previous lemma and denote them by Z,“(M) and Z:(N), 
respectively. Then we have for all (Y E On and m E IM] 
H( m) E Z,“(N) w mEZf(M). 
This implies the assertion. 0 
Theorem 3.8. Assume that 
(Cl) T is an inductive data base for I’, 
(C2) T is weakly categorical modulo _P, 
(C3) M is a countable model of T. 
Then IND,(M, T) is a f-minimal model of CWA,(T). 
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PROOF. Lemma 3.6 implies that 
IND,(M, T) k T. (1) 
Now let a be a ground term such that 
Tb‘I’;(a). (4 
for some i = 1,. . . , n. Then there exists a countable L structure N which has the 
properties 
NI= T, 
N k -2,(u). 
By assumption (C2) 
M=NmoduloP - 




and hence, by the previous lemma, 
IND,(M, T) = INDp(N, T). (6) 
Lemma 3.6 and (3) also tell us that N is an _P extension of IND,(N, T). Thus 
IND,(N, T) t=+(a) (7) 
according to Lemma 2.17 and (4), whereas 
INDf(M, 7’) b TPi(U) (8) 
according to Lemma 2.1, (6), and (7). This, together with (l), proves that IND,(M, T) 
is a model CWA,(T); the _P minimality follows from Lemma 3.6. q 
In order to get rid of the strong requirement of weak categoricity modulo _P, we 
now pay special attention to Z-inductive data bases. We will later see that in this 
case we get along with the weaker assumption of the existence of a primary model. 
Lemma 3.9. Assume that T is a Z-inductive data base for _P, and M a primary model 
of T modulo _P. Then IND,(M, T) is a model of 
T + { -, A : A is a _P-positive ground Z formula & T I+ A}. 
In particular, IND,(M, T) is a model of CWA,(T). 
PROOF. According to Lemma 3.6, IND,(M, T) is a model of T. Now assume that 
T I+ A for some _P-positive ground Z formula A. Then there exists a countable L 
structure N with the properties 
N k T, (0 
Nk,A. (2) 
Since M is a primary model of T modulo _P, N has a substructure N’ which is 
isomorphic to M modulo _P: 
N’ = M modulo _P. (3) 
Hence N’ k T_(f). But T+(E) U {,A) is a set of II formulas, and N’ is a model 
of this set by Lemma 2.4. Thus we have 
N’k Tu {,A}. (4) 
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Now consider the structure IND,(N’, T). From Lemma 3.6 we see that N’ is a _P 
extension of IND,(N’, T). Because of (4) and the _P negativity of ,A we conclude 
first that 
IND,(N’, T) k TA (5) 
and use (3) and Lemma 3.7 to show that IND,(M, .T) is a model of ,A. Thus our 
assertion is proved. It is a trivial consequence that IND,(M, T) is a model of 
CWA,(T). 0 
Theorem 3.10. Assume that 
(Dl) T has a primary model modulo _P, 
(D2) T is a Z-inductive data base for _P. 
Then CWA,(T) is a conservative extension of T for all _P-positive ground Z 
formulas. 
PROOF. First of all, CWA,(T) is an extension of T by definition. Now suppose 
that A is a E-positive ground Z formula which is provable in CWA,( T). Hence, by 
Lemma 3.9, IND,(M, T) is a model of A. And, again by Lemma 3.9, this implies 
that A is provable in T. 0 
Corollary 3.11. If T has a primary model modulo _P and is a Z-inductive data base for 
_P, then CWA,(T) is consistent. 
It is an easy exercise to show that the previous results can be extended to a 
sequence _P = P,, , . . , P,, of relation symbols of arbitrary (finite) arities. One can 
either redo all arguments for this more general case or assume that each T contains 
sufficient coding possibilities to reduce an n-ary relation to a unary one. Anyway, 
using these generalizations, Corollary 3.11 has a nice consequence for logic pro- 
grams. 
Corollary 3.12. If T is a logic program (or a consistent set of universal closures of 
Horn clauses) and _P = P,, . , . , P,, the list of all relation symbols which occur in T, 
then CWA,(T) is consistent; i.e., the use of the closed world assumption is justi$ed 
in connection with logic programs (and consistent sets of universal closures of Horn 
clauses). 
PROOF. Let T* be the theory 
T+{a#b:a,bground&Tt+a=b}. 
By a proof-theoretic argument one can show that 
TtA w T*tA 
for all atomic sentences which are positive in _P and do not contain the equality 
symbol. This implies that 
CWA,(T) c CWA,(T*). 
We first observe that T* is a Z-inductive data base for 8. In view of Corollary 3.11, 
it only remains to show that T* has a primary model modulo _P. In order to prove 
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this, we first define a binary relation - on the ground terms of L; we set 
U-b := T*l-a=b. 
Clearly - is an equivalence relation on the set of all ground terms. The equivalence 
class of a ground term a with respect o - is designated by [a] _ . We define an L 
structure M by setting 
(i) IMI := {[al _ : a is a ground term of L}, 
(ii) RM := ]M], 
(iii) f”([aJ _ ?. . . ,]a,1 _) := ]f(a,, . . . , a/J - 
for all relation symbols R, function symbols f, and ground terms a,, . . . , ak. Each 
function f M is well defined by (iii), since - is an equivalence relation. It is easy to 
check that M is a primary model of T* modulo &’ provided that T is a logic 
program. 
If T is a consistent set of universal closures of Horn clauses, then there exists a 
model N of T*. In this case the structure M is defined as before, but with (ii) 
replaced by 
(ii’) R”:= {([a,]_, . . . . [~,]_):a, ,..., a,ground&N~R(a, ,..., ak)}. 
The new M is a model of T*, and therefore also a primary model of T* modulo l’, 
since _P is the list of all relation symbols which occur in P. q 
Reiter’s proof of a similar result in [18] made use of ad hoc methods depending 
on unit refutation. An extension and generalization of his theorem have long been 
sought and are now achieved here. It is gratifying that they take their place within a 
systematic framework. 
4. FINAL REMARKS 
We end this paper with some comments concerning possible extensions of and 
generalizations of the notions and results presented so far. 
1. Let I be a collection of ground L formulas, and T an L theory. The closed 
world of T with respect to l? is then defined to be the theory 
CWA,(T):=T+{,A:AEI’&TI+A}. 
This relativized closed world assumption is a natural extension of the version 
studied above. It would be interesting to analyze it for various collections of 
formulas I and to see whether similar results can be achieved. 
2. Using techniques of theories of iterated inductive definitions (e.g. [3]), one 
can easily introduce the notion of iterated (or stratified) inductive data base. 
It seems obvious that the results of this paper are useful for these data bases 
as well and that there is a close connection to the stratified programs of Apt, 
Blair, and Walker [l]. 
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